

2001 가 가 (difference in differences) 0.3 가 20% 1 10%

1.

가, (sorting) (mixing) 가

가

” 1 “

가 , 가

2

(trade-off)

. Epple-Romano(1998)

. Benabou(1996)
()

1

(2002)

2

, (2002), , (2002), (2002),

,

3

가

()

,

가

, Hoxby(2003a)

Hoxby (2003b)가

가

(1)

가? (2)

가

가?

가

30

가

가

(mixing)

(sorting)

3

(integrated)

(segregated)

가
(Benabou, 1996).

가 가
가

2001 가 가 가
 6 , 3 , 1
 2 100 1 , , , , ,
 , ,

(difference in differences)
 가 ,
 0.19 0.38 가 ,
 (quantile regression)
 가 .

“ (a rising tide that lifts all boats)”

2
 3 4
 , 5

2.

2.1

1974 가 ,
 . 2001 , 7 11
 1969 51 , 191 65
 .
 가
 .
 , 가
 11 ,

가 (sorting) 가 (mixing) (tracking)

가 ,

가

가

가 2001 47

가

“(tracking)”

2001

31

4

가

(Tibout choice)

5

4

5

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

가

2.2

(sorting)

() (mixing) ()

가

가

(mixing) (sorting)

(peer effect)가

가

가

가

() 가 (

가 . ,

가 . 가 .

가 , , , ,

가 ,

가 가 가 .

가

가

70 .

가

가 “ ”

가 “

(1978,1979) , (1995) 3

가 .

(1997) (1998)

(

). (1988)
 ((1999),
) 가 . (1997)
 , (2001)
 .
 2001 가 가
 “ (adjusted difference-in-difference
 regression)”

3.

3.1

가 가 가 .
 2001 6 6 , 3 , 1 2
 100 1 , , , , ,
 . 6
 3-5 , 3 6- 2 , 1
 1-3 , 2 3- 1 .
 . , ,
 , , , , ,
 , , , , ,
 , (, ,
),
 .
 , , , ,
 가 .
 .
 ,

. , 72 10
 . 62 .
 , 가 가 .
 , .
 .
 , 가 ,
 가 가 가 .
 , 가 ,
 , , 가
 . 가
 . 가
 가 ,
 가 15,054 3,024 1,560
 1 1,464 2 . 1 가 317
 , 1,243 . 2 276 ,
 1,188 .

3.2

(difference in differences)

6

6 Angrist Krueger(1999)

$$Z_i = \frac{Y_i - \mu}{\sigma} \quad \text{가 } \mu = \frac{\mu_1 + \mu_2}{2} \quad \sigma^2 = \frac{\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2}{2}$$

(standardized score: $(\text{ } - \text{ }) / \text{ }$)

$$\delta = E[Y_{1i} | c, g] - E[Y_{0i} | c, g] \quad \text{가 } c = M, g = 1 \quad \text{가 } c = S, g = 2$$

$$\delta = E[Y_{1i} | S, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | S, 2]$$

$$E[Y_{0i} | S, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | S, 1] = E[Y_{0i} | M, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | M, 1]$$

$$E[Y_{0i} | S, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | S, 1] = E[Y_{0i} | M, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | M, 1]$$

$$E[Y_{0i} | S, 2] = E[Y_{0i} | S, 1] + \{E[Y_{0i} | M, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | M, 1]\}$$

δ

$\delta = \{E[Y_{1i} | S, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | S, 1]\} - \{E[Y_{0i} | M, 2] - E[Y_{0i} | M, 1]\}$

δ

$Y_i = \beta_c + \gamma_g + \delta M_i + \varepsilon_i$

c yg , $E[1 | c, g] = 0$, M_i i 가 S

2 1 가 가

$(c \{S, M\})$, $(g \{S, M\})$, M_i

X_i 가 (adjusted difference-in-difference regression)

$Y_i = X_i' \beta_0 + \beta_c + \gamma_g + \delta M_i + \varepsilon_i$

$< 1 >$ 1 2

$< 2 >$

$< 1 >$ (100

$)$

가

가

1 가 9 0.6

2 가

가 ,

$.7$

4.

4.1

< 3> A
 1 2 0.26
 0.07
 0.19 가
 1 가 1-3 , 가
 2 1
 0.26 가
 가 가 가
 , 0.191 = -0.072 - (-0.263)

< 3> B 6 3
 가
 , 가
 3
 0 가 가
 , 가
 , 3
 가
 ,
 , < 3> A
 가
 가 가

< 1>
 가 1
 8 3 1
 1
 가
 가 3

가 1 가

가

4.2

< 4> (3)-(6)

(3) 가 ,

< 3> A (3)

, 0.191 가

(4)-(6) (4)

, (5) ,

(6) 가

가 (0.304 0.384)

(1)-(2) 2

가 가

(2), 1
.(1).

(7) < 3> B 6 3

(8)

, 가

가 (8)

9

가 (4)-(6)

(3)

⁹ (8)

(4)-(6)

가

가

가

가

¹⁰

(8)

가

(

6

)

가

< 4>

가

가

(8),

(6).

가

가

,

가

가

. (6) (8)

3

< 5>

가

가

가

0.3

?

10

가

가

가

가

4.3

< 6>

(quantile regression)

(median

regression)

50 (50 percentile)

가

가 90

90

10

가

90

(10)

< 6>

< 4> (6)

가 < 6>

가

0.25 0.38

가

()

가 ()

“(Pareto Improvement)”

5.

가

가

0.3

가

20%

1

10%

,
 .
 가 : 1)
 가
 , 2)
 가
 , 3)
 가 .
 가 ,
 (mixing) 가 ,
 ()
 가 ,
 가
 가
 (, ,
 , 2002), 가
 .
 2001 가
 가
 “
 (adjusted difference-in-difference regression)”
 .
 ,
 가 .
 ,
 (regime)
 (Hoxby(2000) Kahn, Markman, Rivkin(2003))

가 .¹¹
(marginal change) (regime change)
가
가 가 ,
,
.
(long-run equilibrium) 가 가
.
,
(Hanushek - Luque, 2003) ,
. Hanushek(2002)
,
가
,
가 가
()
가 .

- (2001), ,
- • • (1995), ,
- (1978), 가 :1 , .
- (1979), 가 :2 , .
- (1998), , 7 3 , pp.
235-260.

¹¹ Angrist-Lang(2002)
Metco .

(2002), , 2002-
-15,
• • (2002), : ,
—
(1997), ,
(1999), , 26
2
(2002), , 11 1 , 2002. 6., pp.
237~269.
• (2002), , 8 2 ,
2002. 8., pp. 1~51.

- Angrist, Joshua D., and Alan B. Krueger (1999), "Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics," in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3A, editors Orley C. Ashenfelter and David Card, North-Holland.
- Angrist, Joshua D., and Kevin Lang (2002), "How Important Are Classroom Peer Effects? Evidence from Boston's Metro Program," NBER Working paper 9263.
- Argys, L.M., D.I. Rees and D.J. Brewer (1996), "Detracking America's Schools: Equity at Zero Cost," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 623-645.
- American Association of University Women Educational Foundation, "*How Schools Shortchange Girls: The AAUW Report*", Marlowe & Company, New York, 1995.
- Benabou, Roland (1994), "Education, Income Distribution, and Growth: The Local Connection," NBER Working Paper 4798.
- Benabou, Roland (1996), "Heterogeneity, Stratification and Growth: Macroeconomic Implications of Community Structure and School Finance," American Economic Review, vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 584-609.
- Buchinsky, Moshe (1994), "Changes in the US Wage Structure 1963-1987: Application of Quantile Regression," Econometrica, vol. 62, pp. 405-458.
- Campbell, Donald T (1969), "Reforms as Experiments," American Psychologist XXIV: 409-429.
- Card, David E. (1990), "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43: 245-257.
- Eissa, Nada (2001), "Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: the 1986 Tax Reform Act as a Natural Experiment," NBER working paper 5023.
- Epple, D., and R.E. Romano (1998), "Competition Between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, vol. 88, no. 1, pp. 33-62.
- Godo, Yoshihisa (2001), "Accumulation of Education in Korea's Economic Development: 1910-2000",

- mimeograph, Meiji Gakuin University.
- Hanushek, Eric A. (2002), "Publicly provided education," in Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 4, edited by A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein. Elsevier.
- Hanushek, E.A. and J.A. Luque (2003). "Efficiency and Equity in Schools Around the World," Economics of Education Review, vol. 22, no. 4.
- Hanushek, E.A., J.F. Kain, J.M. Markman and S.G. Rivkin (forthcoming), "Does Peer Ability Affect Student Achievement?" Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Hoxby, Caroline Minter (2000), "Peer Effects in the Classroom: Learning from Gender and Race Variation," NBER Working Paper 7867.
- Hoxby, Caroline Minter (2001), "All Schools Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, no. 4, pp. 1189-1231.
- Hoxby, Caroline Minter (2003a), "School Choice and School Productivity (or Could School Choice Be a Tide That Lifts All Boats?)," in The Economics of School Choice, edited by C. Hoxby, university of Chicago Press.
- Hoxby, Caroline Minter (2003b), "School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States," unpublished manuscript.
- Kim, Sunwoong, and Ju-Ho Lee (2002a), "Private Tutoring and Demand for Education in South Korea", KDI School Working Paper.
- Kim, Sunwoong, and Ju-Ho Lee (2002b), "The Secondary School Equalization Policy in South Korea," KDI School Working Paper.
- Kim, Taejong, Ju-Ho Lee, and Young Lee (2003), "Mixing versus Sorting in Schooling: Evidence from the Equalization Policy in South Korea," KDI School Working Paper
- Sacerdote, Bruce (2000), "Peer Effects with Random Assignment: Results for Dartmouth Roommates," NBER Working paper 7469.
- Zimmer R.W., and E.F. Toma (2000), "Peer Effects in Private and Public Schools Across Countries," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 75-92.

1.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	<i>=317</i>		<i>=1243</i>		<i>=4315</i>	
– (0-100)	62.57	11.19	53.15	16.24	52.33	15.52
– (0-100)	67.35	11.92	61.70	15.44	60.42	15.73
– (0-100)	60.38	17.05	50.17	19.98	49.64	20.25
– (0-100)	59.58	16.24	47.86	21.09	47.55	20.19
– (0-100)	65.49	15.31	55.40	19.02	54.28	17.73
– (0-100)	60.04	12.62	50.62	16.85	49.74	16.06
–	0.66	0.72	0.05	1.05	0.00	1.00
–	0.44	0.76	0.08	0.98	0.00	1.00
–	0.53	0.84	0.03	0.99	0.00	1.00
–	0.60	0.80	0.02	1.04	0.00	1.00
–	0.63	0.86	0.06	1.07	0.00	1.00
–	0.64	0.79	0.05	1.05	0.00	1.00
2	<i>=276</i>		<i>=1188</i>		<i>=4381</i>	
– (0-100)	61.42	10.36	54.81	17.75	55.11	15.90
– (0-100)	71.30	11.73	63.80	18.30	64.72	16.73
– (0-100)	51.61	13.63	47.51	20.31	47.48	19.10
– (0-100)	47.67	18.12	41.74	21.76	42.06	20.60
– (0-100)	71.41	11.62	64.06	18.87	64.31	17.39
– (0-100)	65.11	12.91	56.96	19.72	56.98	17.56
– I	0.40	0.65	-0.02	1.12	0.00	1.00
–	0.39	0.70	-0.06	1.09	0.00	1.00
–	0.22	0.71	0.00	1.06	0.00	1.00
–	0.27	0.88	-0.02	1.06	0.00	1.00
–	0.41	0.67	-0.01	1.08	0.00	1.00
–	0.46	0.74	0.00	1.12	0.00	1.00

2.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	<i>N=317</i>		<i>N=1243</i>		<i>N=1560</i>	
(0, 1)	0.35	0.48	0.56	0.50	0.46	0.50
(: 6 - 18)	11.98	2.53	11.47	2.49	11.67	2.62
(: 6 - 18)	13.37	2.73	12.65	2.83	12.83	2.90
(0, 1)	0.01	0.10	0.01	0.09	0.01	0.12
가 (0, 1)	0.62	0.49	0.58	0.49	0.60	0.49
(0, 5)	1.10	1.45	1.17	1.60	1.50	1.70
(0, 5)	1.23	1.20	1.13	1.15	1.10	1.09
()	36.57	6.15	35.87	3.58	37.44	4.74
()	10.39	5.93	10.13	3.50	11.60	4.58
()	28.30	2.81	26.22	6.82	28.51	10.56
(0, 1)	0.65	0.48	0.42	0.49	0.53	0.50
(0, 1)	0.23	0.42	0.25	0.43	0.21	0.41
(0, 1)	0.54	0.50	0.24	0.43	0.35	0.48
2	<i>N=276</i>		<i>N=1188</i>		<i>N=1464</i>	
(0, 1)	0.39	0.49	0.40	0.49	0.48	0.50
(:6 - 18)	11.94	2.16	11.15	2.26	11.47	2.72
(:6 - 18)	13.08	2.66	12.17	3.08	12.58	3.03
(0, 1)	0.01	0.08	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.13
가 (0, 1)	0.53	0.50	0.61	0.49	0.60	0.49
(0, 5)	0.87	1.33	0.90	1.35	1.26	1.56
(0, 5)	1.29	1.09	1.43	1.39	1.26	1.21
()	37.32	3.64	38.13	3.59	38.77	4.22
()	11.67	2.80	12.03	3.37	12.61	4.10
()	30.52	3.43	24.85	7.73	28.74	10.89
(0, 1)	0.67	0.47	0.48	0.50	0.56	0.50
(0, 1)	0.39	0.49	0.16	0.37	0.31	0.46
(0, 1)	0.61	0.49	0.37	0.48	0.36	0.48

3.

A.		1	2	
				-
	1	0.660 (0.721)	0.053 (1.046)	-0.607 (0.062)**
	2	0.397 (0.701)	-0.019 (1.117)	-0.416 (0.070)**
	2 - 1	-0.263 (0.057)**	-0.072 (0.044)	0.191 (0.093)*
B.		6	3	
				-
	6	-0.065 (0.964)	0.140 (0.983)	0.205 (0.054)**
	3	0.165 (0.978)	0.038 (0.981)	-0.127 (0.054)*
	3 - 6	0.230 (0.064)**	-0.102 (0.040)**	-0.333 (0.076)**
		, + 10%	, * 5%	, ** 1%

4.

	(1) 2	(2) 1	(3)	(4) 2	(5) 1	(6)	(7) 6	(8) 3
가								
가			0.191 (0.093)	0.384 (0.089)	0.361 (0.086)	0.304 (0.082)	-0.333 (0.076)	-0.149 (0.078)
(& 2(3))			-0.263 (0.084)	-0.394 (0.080)	-0.358 (0.077)	-0.362 (0.074)	0.230 (0.065)	0.046 (0.067)
2 (3) 가								
가	-0.068 (0.073)	-0.230 (0.056)	-0.607 (0.064)	-0.394 (0.062)	-0.332 (0.060)	-0.339 (0.058)	0.205 (0.054)	0.143 (0.056)
	-0.034 (0.021)	-0.206 (0.020)		-0.140 (0.015)	-0.119 (0.015)	-0.103 (0.014)		0.012 (0.008)
	0.059 (0.021)	0.202 (0.021)		0.132 (0.015)	0.116 (0.015)	0.101 (0.014)		0.002 (0.008)
	0.038 (0.021)	0.213 (0.024)		0.087 (0.017)	0.092 (0.016)	0.101 (0.015)		0.016 (0.006)
^2	0.000 (0.000)	-0.003 (0.000)		-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)
	0.015 (0.061)	0.432 (0.054)		0.301 (0.043)	0.277 (0.041)	0.231 (0.040)		
	0.372 (0.084)	-0.285 (0.061)		-0.112 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.052)	0.000 (0.050)		
	0.078 (0.074)	0.294 (0.069)		0.313 (0.043)	0.230 (0.052)	0.157 (0.049)		
	-0.213 (0.078)	-0.083 (0.063)			-0.128 (0.053)	-0.130 (0.050)		0.080 (0.032)
	0.047 (0.013)	0.040 (0.011)			0.046 (0.009)	0.040 (0.009)		0.023 (0.008)
	0.033 (0.011)	0.036 (0.010)			0.053 (0.008)	0.039 (0.008)		0.067 (0.008)
	-0.069 (0.236)	-0.078 (0.229)			-0.056 (0.176)	-0.046 (0.168)		-0.363 (0.119)
가	0.006 (0.049)	0.047 (0.042)			0.026 (0.034)	0.026 (0.033)		0.106 (0.033)
	0.011 (0.018)	0.012 (0.014)				0.018 (0.011)		0.086 (0.010)
	0.264 (0.019)	0.180 (0.018)				0.228 (0.013)		0.033 (0.016)
Adjusted R^2	1464 0.278	1560 0.360	3024 0.043	3024 0.166	3024 0.220	3024 0.291	3355 0.005	3355 0.113

, + 10%

, * 5%

, ** 1%

5. 1 2

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	가	0.191	0.304	0.289	0.366	0.292	0.326
(& 2)		(0.093)*	(0.082)**	(0.090)**	(0.081)**	(0.093)**	(0.083)**
2	가	-0.263	-0.362	-0.314	-0.365	-0.323	-0.368
		(0.084)**	(0.074)**	(0.081)**	(0.073)**	(0.083)**	(0.075)**
	가	-0.607	-0.339	-0.504	-0.260	-0.580	-0.336
		(0.064)**	(0.058)**	(0.062)**	(0.057)**	(0.064)**	(0.058)**
	a						
		3024	3024	3024	3024	3024	3024
Adjusted R^2		0.043	0.291	0.026	0.252	0.033	0.266

		(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	가	0.146	0.243	0.123	0.228	-0.089	0.108
(& 2)		(0.094)	(0.087)**	(0.095)	(0.087)**	(0.090)	(0.085)
2	가	-0.224	-0.319	-0.178	-0.282	-0.047	-0.199
		(0.085)**	(0.078)**	(0.085)*	(0.078)**	(0.081)	(0.076)**
	가	-0.569	-0.343	-0.587	-0.321	-0.359	-0.189
		(0.065)**	(0.061)**	(0.065)**	(0.061)**	(0.062)**	(0.059)**
	a						
		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
		3024	3024	3024	3024	3024	3024
Adjusted R^2		0.039	0.228	0.041	0.233	0.029	0.193

, + 10% , * 5% , ** 1%

a 4 “ ” “ ”

6. , , 10 11
 , =3024

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
		10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90
(가 & 2)	가	0.254 (0.131)	0.342 (0.130)	0.253 (0.102)	0.279 (0.107)	0.295 (0.099)	0.378 (0.098)	0.360 (0.113)	0.298 (0.105)	0.273 (0.122)
	가	-0.331 (0.120)	-0.404 (0.118)	-0.340 (0.092)	-0.330 (0.096)	-0.369 (0.089)	-0.352 (0.088)	-0.330 (0.102)	-0.331 (0.095)	-0.321 (0.112)
^2	가	-0.645 (0.091)	-0.526 (0.090)	-0.400 (0.071)	-0.367 (0.075)	-0.285 (0.069)	-0.305 (0.069)	-0.253 (0.080)	-0.198 (0.074)	-0.090 (0.086)
		-0.174 (0.022)	-0.148 (0.023)	-0.123 (0.018)	-0.101 (0.018)	-0.096 (0.017)	-0.084 (0.017)	-0.073 (0.019)	-0.066 (0.018)	-0.036 (0.021)
		0.184 (0.024)	0.149 (0.024)	0.121 (0.018)	0.097 (0.019)	0.091 (0.017)	0.073 (0.017)	0.059 (0.019)	0.061 (0.018)	0.042 (0.022)
		0.087 (0.028)	0.133 (0.027)	0.131 (0.020)	0.128 (0.021)	0.130 (0.018)	0.113 (0.018)	0.132 (0.020)	0.100 (0.018)	0.102 (0.020)
		-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)	-0.002 (0.000)
		0.328 (0.067)	0.291 (0.064)	0.285 (0.049)	0.235 (0.052)	0.242 (0.048)	0.230 (0.047)	0.192 (0.054)	0.154 (0.051)	0.098 (0.061)
		0.045 (0.079)	-0.109 (0.078)	-0.027 (0.061)	-0.025 (0.064)	0.003 (0.060)	-0.010 (0.059)	-0.001 (0.069)	0.012 (0.063)	-0.018 (0.073)
		0.267 (0.075)	0.241 (0.076)	0.212 (0.060)	0.204 (0.064)	0.131 (0.059)	0.100 (0.059)	0.081 (0.069)	0.026 (0.065)	-0.052 (0.077)
가		0.120 (0.082)	0.087 (0.080)	0.022 (0.062)	-0.014 (0.065)	-0.170 (0.060)	-0.261 (0.060)	-0.335 (0.070)	-0.371 (0.065)	-0.353 (0.077)
		0.045 (0.015)	0.047 (0.014)	0.036 (0.011)	0.033 (0.012)	0.043 (0.011)	0.039 (0.010)	0.047 (0.012)	0.048 (0.011)	0.036 (0.013)
		-0.007 (0.012)	0.010 (0.012)	0.021 (0.010)	0.034 (0.010)	0.036 (0.009)	0.044 (0.009)	0.043 (0.011)	0.050 (0.010)	0.062 (0.012)
		0.167 (0.237)	0.169 (0.257)	0.037 (0.205)	0.021 (0.210)	-0.148 (0.198)	-0.239 (0.192)	-0.124 (0.229)	-0.137 (0.209)	-0.367 (0.221)
		-0.018 (0.053)	-0.007 (0.052)	-0.010 (0.041)	0.023 (0.043)	0.025 (0.039)	-0.007 (0.039)	0.016 (0.045)	0.027 (0.042)	0.042 (0.050)
		0.054 (0.019)	0.034 (0.018)	0.022 (0.014)	0.017 (0.015)	0.020 (0.014)	0.012 (0.013)	0.018 (0.015)	0.019 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.017)
		0.192 (0.023)	0.219 (0.022)	0.223 (0.017)	0.249 (0.017)	0.253 (0.016)	0.249 (0.016)	0.230 (0.018)	0.208 (0.017)	0.174 (0.019)

, + 10%

, * 5%

, ** 1%

1.

